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NAVIGATING BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS:  
HOW THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT TURNED 
RESTRAINT INTO POWER PLAY†♦ 
INTRODUCTION: MOVING BEYOND EXISTENTIAL CHALLENGES TO CONFRONT 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT’S CONTEMPORARY DILEMMAS 
Across nearly two decades since its establishment, volumes have been 
written and feature films produced devoted to recounting the embattled origin 
story of the International Criminal Court (ICC or the Court).1 Despite hand-
wringing by perennial skeptics;2 opposition of persistent objectors, notably 
including the United States;3 and second-guessing from disenchanted former 
proponents,4 the ICC is now, in the words of its current chief prosecutor, “a 
fact of life.”5 And yet, despite having been a half-century in the making,6 
“construction [on the Court] continues.”7  
 
 † The title of this Comment is drawn from Odysseus’s fictional triumphant helmsmanship of his 
vessel through the modern-day Strait of Sicily between two mythical sea monsters. HOMER, THE ODYSSEY (c. 
725 B.C.E.). The International Criminal Court (ICC) decision at issue in this Comment is Prosecutor v. Al-
Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-302, Decision under article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the non-
compliance by South Africa with the request by the Court for the arrest and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir 
(July 6, 2017) [hereinafter Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision], https://www.icc-
cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2017_04402.PDF. 
 ♦ This Comment received the 2018 Emory International Law Review Founder’s Award for 
Excellence in Legal Research and Writing. 
 1 See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. SCHIFF, BUILDING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2008); MICHAEL 
J. STRUETT, THE POLITICS OF CONSTRUCTING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NGOS, DISCOURSE, 
AND AGENCY (2008); THE COURT (Michele Gentile & Marcus Vetter prods., 2013); THE RECKONING: THE 
BATTLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (Skylight Pictures 2008).  
 2 Such as Alan Dershowitz and Eric Posner; See Shawn Macomber, Alan Dershowitz Should Expand 
His Case Against the ICC, FRONTIERS OF FREEDOM (Feb. 1, 2015), https://www.ff.org/alan-dershowitz-icc-
lawfare/; Eric Posner, The Absurd Criminal Court, WALL. ST. J. (June 10, 2012), https://www.wsj.com/ 
articles/SB10001424052702303753904577452122153205162; See generally JENS DAVID OHLIN, THE 
ASSAULT ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 1–14 (2015) (critiquing prominent detractors of international law, 
including Jack Goldsmith, Eric Posner, and John Yoo). 
 3 See, e.g., David J. Scheffer, The United States and the International Criminal Court, 93 AM. J. 
INT’L L. 12 (1999); David J. Scheffer, U.S. Policy and the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 529 (1999); Megan A. Fairlie, The United States and the International Criminal Court Post-Bush: A 
Beautiful Courtship but Unlikely Marriage, 29 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 528 (2011). 
 4 Including several African states and the African Union (AU) itself; See, e.g., Rowland J. V. Cole, 
Africa’s Relationship with the International Criminal Court: More Political than Legal, 14 MELBOURNE J. 
INT’L L. 670 (2013); Max Du Plessis & Christopher Gevers, Balancing Competing Obligations: The Rome 
Statute and AU Decisions, INST. FOR SECURITY STUD. PAPER 225 (Oct. 2011). 
 5 H.E. Fatou Bensouda, Statement at the Africa Legal Aid Conference: Africa and the ICC: One 
Decade On (Sept. 11, 2014), http://www.africalegalaId.com/africa-and-the-icc-one-decade-on-africa-and-the-
icc-lessons-learned-and-synergies-ahead/; see also Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, President, Int’l Crim. Ct., 
Opening Remarks at the High-Level Regional Seminar, The International Criminal Court and South 
America: Opportunities for Cooperation and Exchanges of Experience at 20 Years of the Rome Statute (June 
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Caught between powerful international organizations on one side and 
domineering states (including both States Parties and influential non-States 
Parties)8 on the other, the Court is buffeted between the proverbial twin 
demons of Scylla and Charybdis. Navigating this treacherous course requires 
both skill and a steady hand at the helm (favorable winds would also be 
welcomed, although not necessarily expected, as this Comment further 
explains).  
Recently, and without much fanfare, the ICC had the occasion to 
demonstrate both traits, as it confronted one of the latest in a series of flagrant 
instances of non-compliance with the outstanding arrest warrant for Sudanese 
President Omar al-Bashir.9 In a remarkable display of maturity and Solomonic 
judicial creativity, the bench found a way to assert itself while giving the 
outward appearance of deference. In so doing, the Court has proven that it can 
think and act politically without becoming politicized.10  
A. Infancy to Adolescence: The ICC’s Difficult Childhood and Growing 
Pains 
Since its inception, the Court has confronted the fundamental challenge of 
balancing judicial independence against inevitable and necessary 
interdependence with other institutions and actors.11 Its own former president 
 
7, 2018) (“International criminal justice, for the purposes of accountability, is here to stay.”) (transcript 
available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/news/seminarsDocuments/180607-seminar-ecuador-stat-president_ENG. 
pdf). 
 6 “Though the Rome Statute was adopted 20 years ago, the dream that culminated that event started 
well over 50 years before. In our own turn . . . we may . . . allow ourselves to dream to improve the 
edifice . . . [and] make the world a better place for humanity.” Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, President, Int’l Crim. 
Ct., Remarks at Solemn Hearing in Commemoration of the 20th Anniversary of the Rome Statute of the 
International Criminal Court (July 17, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/itemsDocuments/20180717-pres-
speech.pdf; see also WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 4, 8–
11 (5th ed. 2017). 
 7 STRUETT, supra note 2, at 179. 
 8 I.e., The United States, Russia, and China. See The States Parties to the Rome Statute, infra note 67. 
 9 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. While President al-Bashir’s last 
name is transliterated from Arabic to the Roman alphabet with various spellings, this Comment will use the 
aforementioned spelling throughout for consistency, except where other sources are directly quoted and 
employ other variations. 
 10 To state that the Court and its members have acted politically is not intended in any way to impugn 
its motivations, but to suggest that it has demonstrated an ability to operate strategically. 
 11 Judge Philippe Kirsch, President, Int’l Crim. Ct., Frederick K. Cox Lecture in Global Legal Reform: 
The International Criminal Court: Independence in a Context of Interdependence, Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law (Nov. 7, 2005); see also Martin J. Burke & Thomas G. Weiss, The Security 
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has suggested that the cooperation of States, intergovernmental organizations, 
and civil society is sine qua non for the Court to deliver effectively on its 
mission to end impunity.12  
During the protracted negotiations, from early talks at U.N. Headquarters 
in New York to the final Rome conference,13 advocates sought to protect the 
Court from political machinations, including the influence of powerful 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council (U.N.S.C.).14 
Upon the adoption of the Rome Statute for the ICC, then-United Nations 
(U.N.) Secretary General Kofi Annan famously lauded the Court as “a gift of 
hope to future generations, and a giant step forward in the march towards 
universal human rights and the rule of law.”15 Others have hailed the Court’s 
founding as “one of the boldest progressive moves in the history of 
international relations.”16 However, observers are fond of saying that 
international law is “in recession,”17 “under assault,”18 or “in crisis.”19 Entire 
 
Council and Ad Hoc Tribunals: Law and Politics, Peace and Justice, in THE SECURITY COUNCIL AS GLOBAL 
LEGISLATOR 241, 242 (Vesselin Popovski & Trudy Fraser, eds. 2014). 
 12 Judge Philippe Kirsch, The Role of the International Criminal Court in Enforcing International 
Criminal Law, 22 AM. U. L. REV. 539, 547 (2007) (“The Court will never be able to end impunity alone. Its 
success will depend upon the support and commitment of States, international organizations, and civil 
society.”); see also Burke & Weiss, supra note 12, at 242. 
 13 “The negotiations for the International Criminal Court took place almost entirely at the United 
Nations [in New York]. They would be authorized by the United Nations General Assembly, take place in 
committees it created and end in a diplomatic conference convened by the UN [in Rome] . . . . The Ad Hoc 
Committee and the Preparatory Committee met in halls on the ground floor of the conference wing of the 
United Nations building in New York.” FANNY BENEDETTI, KARINE BONNEAU, & JOHN WASHBURN, 
NEGOTIATING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: NEW YORK TO ROME, 1994-1998, at 17, 20 (2014). 
The process culminated in the grand Campidoglio in Rome; See Press Release, UN Diplomatic Conference 
Concludes in Rome with Decision to Establish Permanent International Court, U.N. Press Release L/2889 
(July 20, 1998), https://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2889.html; See generally M. Cherif Bassiouni, 
Negotiating the Treaty of Rome on the Establishment of the International Criminal Court, 32 CORNELL INT’L 
L.J. 443 (1999); John Washburn, The Negotiation of the Rome Statute for the International Criminal Court 
and International Lawmaking in the 21st Century, 11 PACE INT’L L. REV. 361 (1999). 
 14 STRUETT, supra note 2, at 165. 
 15 Press Release, Secretary-General Says Establishment of International Criminal Court is Major Step 
in March towards Universal Human Rights, Rule of Law, U.N. Press Release L/2890 (July 20, 1998), 
http://www.un.org/press/en/1998/19980720.l2890.html.  
 16 Leslie Vinjamuri, The International Criminal Court and the Paradox of Authority, 75 L. & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 275 (2016). 
 17 Christine Kaufman, International Law in Recession? The Role of International Law When Crisis 
Hits: Food, Finance, and Climate Change, in FROM BILATERALISM TO COMMUNITY INTEREST: ESSAYS IN 
HONOUR OF BRUNO SIMMA (Ulrich Fastenrath et al. eds., 2011). 
 18 See OHLIN, supra note 3.  
 19 Rafael Domingo, The Crisis of International Law, 42 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1543 (2009); Joel P. 
Tractman, The Crisis of International Law, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L. L. 407 (2011), http:// 
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conferences have been dedicated to the latter topic.20 Even one of its 
staunchest and most celebrated advocates, the Hon. Richard Goldstone, when 
asked to discuss “international law in crisis,” demurred, only to go on to 
suggest that there was a crisis with regard to its implementation.21 Although 
“normative consensus and organizational machinery have largely been 
established . . . the Court is still young.”22 At the frontlines of this 
battleground and now in its adolescence, the ICC continues to struggle to 
assert its autonomy.23  
While well-intentioned, the ambitious notion that the Court could be 
shielded from state interests reflects a naïveté about the realities the ICC 
would confront. As one of its more respected observers suggests, the 
“encomium to legal objectivity understates the complexity of challenges to 
the Court . . . the Statute is ultimately a document of political compromise . . . 
political choices abound at all levels.”24 Phrased differently (and with some 
degree of understatement), “[t]he relationship between the ICC and the United 
Nations Security Council was one of the stumbling blocks in the negotiations 
on the establishment of the Court. . . . The emerging picture is characterized 
as friction.”25 In the summer of 2017, this fractious relationship took a turn. 
 
scholarlycommons.law.case.edu/jil/vol44/iss1/6; Michael P. Scharf, International Law in Crisis: A 
Qualitative Empirical Contribution to the Compliance Debate, 31 CARDOZO L. REV. 45 (2009); Joel P. 
Tractman, The Crisis of International Law, 44 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. (2011). 
 20 In 2011, “ten years after 9/11, legal experts [met] to consider [the] turbulent year” at a Case 
Western Reserve Law School symposium, “International Law in Crisis,” co-sponsored by the American 
branch of the International Law Association, Case Western Reserve’s Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Center, and the American Society of International Law. Accord Symposium Sept. 9 at Case Western Reserve 
University School of Law Tackles a Global Question: Is International Law in Crisis?, PR NEWS WIRE 
(Aug. 10, 2011), https://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/symposium-sept-9-at-case-western-reserve-
university-school-of-law-tackles-a-global-question-is-international-law-in-crisis-127471963.html. 
 21 Hon. Richard Goldstone, The Crisis in the Implementation of International Law, 44 CASE W. RES. J. 
INT’L L. 13, 17–18 (2011). Hon. Goldstone hastened to add that international law “is being relied upon and 
called in aid more frequently by international leaders than ever before,” citing examples from the U.S. and 
Germany. Id. 
 22 SCHIFF, supra note 2, at 257. 
 23 See, e.g., YVONNE DUTTON, RULES, POLITICS, AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
COMMITTING TO THE COURT (2013); see also Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji, President, Int’l Crim. Ct., Keynote 
Address at the 70th Anniversary of the International Law Commission: The International Law Commission 
and the Fight against Impunity (May 8, 2018) (transcript available at https://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
itemsDocuments/180508-pres-stat.pdf) (“International criminal justice . . . is here to stay. And yet, we cannot 
rest content . . . [t]here is still much to do.”). 
 24 DUTTON, supra note 24, at 258 (quoting former ICC President Philippe Kirsch). 
 25 Deborah Ruiz Verduzco, The Relationship between the ICC and the United Nations Security 
Council, in THE LAW AND PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 30, 30 (Carsten Stahn, ed. 
2015). 
SHOOT_COMMENTPROOFS 12/17/2018 12:24 PM 
2018] NAVIGATING BETWEEN SCYLLA AND CHARYBDIS 137 
 
B. Potential Proving Ground and Rite of Passage 
On July 6, 2017, Pre-Trial Chamber II (PTC II) reached decision 
regarding South Africa’s failure to arrest Omar al-Bashir while he was on 
South African sovereign territory for the African Union (AU) summit in June 
2015.26 The decision did two things: first, the Court resoundingly rejected 
South Africa’s claim that sovereign immunity applied to al-Bashir while he 
was on South African soil.27 In fact, this point should have been a foregone 
conclusion, as South African diplomats consulted the Court on the issue prior 
to al-Bashir’s visit and received the same answer.28 Moreover, the Court 
previously had ruled on numerous similar instances of state non-compliance 
with al-Bashir’s arrest warrant (although differing legal arguments were given 
by the various judges in these cases, as discussed in Section III.A.).29  
Having ruled on South Africa’s culpability, PTC II was confronted with a 
second (implicit) decision: to whom to refer the case to take action against 
South Africa given that the Court itself has no mandate to sanction and no 
enforcement mechanism.30 On this second point, the Chamber’s decision is 
notable. Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute provides, 
[w]here a State Party fails to comply with a request to cooperate by 
the Court contrary to the provisions of this Statute, thereby 
preventing the Court from exercising its functions and powers under 
this Statute, the Court may make a finding to that effect and refer 
the matter to the Assembly of States Parties [hereafter, ASP] or, 
where the Security Council referred the matter to the Court, to the 
Security Council.31  
However, it is important to note that, 
 
 26 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
 27 For a more comprehensive discussion of sovereign immunities, See Johan D. van der Vyver, 
Prosecuting the President of Sudan: A Dispute between the African Union and the International Criminal 
Court, 11 AFR. HUMAN RTS. L.J. 683 (2011). 
 28 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
 29 Dov Jacobs, The ICC and Immunities, Round 326: ICC Finds that South Africa had an Obligation 
to Arrest Bashir but no Referral to the U.N.S.C., SPREADING THE JAM (July 6, 2017), https://dovjacobs.com/ 
category/bashir/. 
 30 See Understanding the International Criminal Court, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 19, 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/UICCEng.pdf (“In establishing the ICC, the States set up a 
system based on two pillars. The Court itself is the judicial pillar. The operational pillar belongs to States, 
including the enforcement of Court’s orders.”). 
 31 Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9, July 17, 1998, 37 I.L.M. 
1002 [hereinafter Rome Statute].  
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[w]hile the Court can make such determinations, it has no authority 
to decide on remedies or consequences arising from a failure to 
cooperate. The Statute delegates this function to two executive 
arms, the ASP, and in cases arising from situations referred to by 
the Council, the Security Council. The Council and the Assembly 
are expected to react, within the purview of their own powers, to 
address the instances of non-cooperation . . . . The provisions on 
non-cooperation are the sole manner in which the Court and 
formally and judicially denounce lack of compliance.32 
The Chamber not only used its discretionary authority not to refer the case 
to either of the available enforcement organs, the ASP or the U.N.S.C., but 
took the occasion to criticize both.33 In bold, exceptional, and volatile 
language, PTC II stated that a referral would be “futile” given the numerous 
instances of inaction by both bodies with regard to al-Bashir’s arrest.34 
Further, in a masterful stroke, at a time when “Africa’s current relationship 
with the International Criminal Court has deteriorated considerably”35 and 
South Africa itself has attempted—unsuccessfully—to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute,36 the decision not to recommend sanctions or censorious 
measures gave the State Party an honorable way out of a legal bind. 
Moreover, citing the state’s cooperation (by “self-referring” the matter to the 
ICC) and referencing the decision of its own Constitutional Court also 
reinforced the principle of complementarity, reassuring a suspicious and 
reluctant State Party, as well as chary onlookers (notably, the AU) that the 
ICC respects state sovereignty and does not intend to overstep its mandate.37  
Although largely unnoticed, this Comment posits that the ICC’s decision 
regarding the non-compliance by South Africa regarding the arrest and 
 
 32 Ruiz Verduzco, supra note 26, at 44–45. 
 33 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
 34 Id. 
 35 Juliet Okoth, Africa, the United Nations Security Council and the International Criminal Court: The 
Question of Deferrals, in AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 195 (Gerhard Werle et al. eds., 
2014); see also Ottilia Anna Maunganidze & Anton du Plessis, The ICC and the AU, in THE LAW AND 
PRACTICE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 30, 65 (Carsten Stahn ed. 2015). 
 36 See, e.g., Jason Burke, South African Judge Blocks Attempt to Withdraw from ICC, GUARDIAN (Feb. 
22, 2017); Norimitsu Onishi, South Africa Reverses Withdrawal from International Criminal Court, N.Y. 
TIMES (Mar. 8, 2017); Dewa Mavhinga, South African High Court Rejects ICC Withdrawal, HUM. RTS. 
WATCH DISPATCHES (Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.hrw.org/news/2017/02/22/south-african-high-court-
rejects-icc-withdrawal. 
 37 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
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surrender of Omar al-Bashir represents the Court’s own “Marbury v. Madison 
moment,” whereby an instance of judicial restraint becomes a power play.38 
C. Structure of this Comment and Limitations of Research 
Following an introduction, this Comment reviews the history of the case 
against Omar al-Bashir of Sudan, including the charges against him; his 
subsequent conduct and that of states he visited; and how these developments 
have evinced and contributed to dynamics among and between the ICC, 
individual African states, the AU, and the U.N.S.C. The Comment then 
analyzes the recent and exceptional decision of PTC II regarding South Africa 
in light of previous jurisprudence involving state non-cooperation in al-
Bashir’s arrest. After decoding the messages contained in the decision, the 
Comment explores if and how the decision betokens an evolving rapport for 
the ICC vis-à-vis States Parties and empowering organs. Finally, the 
Comment concludes with some modest recommendations. 
This Comment does not purport to analyze the merits of the al-Bashir 
prosecution; that path is well-trodden.39 Rather, this Comment regards the al-
 
 38 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) (holding that the U.S. Supreme Court does not have the 
power to fulfill the executive function of granting writs of mandamus, while establishing the basis for judicial 
review). The turn-of-phrase is the author’s own. 
 39 For further discussion of accountability for the situation in Darfur, see, for example, Lucas Buzzard, 
Holding an Arsonist’s Feet to the Fire? The Legality and Enforceability of the ICC’s Arrest Warrant for 
Sudanese President Omar Al-Bashir, 24 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 897 (2009); Kathleen A. Doty et al., Toward 
Peace with Justice in Darfur: A Framework for Accountability, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 1 (2011); 
Michael J. Kelly, The Debate Over Genocide in Darfur, Sudan, 18 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 205 
(2011); John E. Tanagho & John P. Hermina, The International Community Responds to Darfur: ICC 
Prosecution Renews Hope for International Justice, 265 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 367 (2009). Regarding 
the theory of prosecution against al-Bashir, see, for example, Theresa Giamanco, The Perpetrator behind the 
Perpetrator: A Critical Analysis of the Theory of Prosecution against Omar Al-Bashir, 25 TEMP. INT’L & 
COMP. L.J. 217 (2011). Concerning the difficulties of enforcing the indictment, see Gwen P. Barnes, The 
International Criminal Court’s Ineffective Enforcement Mechanisms: The Indictment of President Omar Al 
Bashir, 34 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1584 (2011); Saher Valiani, Genocide Left Unchecked:Assessing the ICC’s 
Difficulties Detaining Omar Al-Bashir, 35 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 150 (2017). For a more comprehensive 
discussion of the dispute over sovereign immunities, see, for example, Ntombizozuko Dyani-Mhango, South 
Africa’s Dilemma: Immunity Laws, International Obligations, and the Visit by Sudan’s President Omar Al 
Bashir, 26 WASH. INT’L L.J. 535 (2017); Aoife F. Martin, Stop Letting Them Get Away with Murder: The 
Need to Limit the Use of Head of State Immunity as a Defense for War Crimes and Crimes Against 
Humanity, 48 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 923 (2015); Dan Terzian, Personal Immunity and President Omar Al 
Bashir: An Analysis Under Customary International Law and Security Council Resolution 1593, 16 UCLA J. 
INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 279 (2011); Van der Vyver, Prosecuting the President, supra note 28. Concerning 
the case and its implications for plea bargaining, see, for example, Roza Pati, The ICC and the Case of 
Sudan’s Omar Al Bashir: Is Plea-Bargaining a Valid Option?, 15 U.C. DAVIS J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 265 
(2009). 
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Bashir situation as illuminating the broader dynamics between the ICC and its 
empowering organs. The Comment specifically considers the legal 
significance of Pre-Trial Chamber II’s recent decision regarding South Africa 
and what it may portend for interinstitutional relations in the future.40 
I. OMAR AL-BASHIR; THE CONTENTIOUS RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN AFRICA, 
THE COURT, AND THE U.N.S.C.; AND POWER STRUGGLES IN THE FIGHT 
AGAINST IMPUNITY 
President al-Bashir is the only sitting head of state or government with a 
currently outstanding arrest warrant before the ICC.41 While the merits of the 
charges and history of the case against al-Bashir are not the direct subject of 
this inquiry, it is necessary to provide a brief overview of the prosecution to 
illustrate how this case became a battleground in the complex and ongoing 
power struggles among the ICC, individual member states, the AU, and the 
ICC’s own empowering organs: the ASP and the U.N.S.C. 
A. The Charges against President al-Bashir 
Since 2004, “dozens of political officials and bodies (including the U.S. 
Congress and the [European] Parliament)” have categorized the situation in 
Darfur as a genocide, with varying degrees of fervor.42 A notable example 
was “Senator, candidate, and President Obama [who] not only declared that 
genocide was occurring in Darfur, but campaigned on the issue in 2008, 
referring to the Darfur genocide as a ‘stain on our souls.’”43 Leading human 
rights authorities and “such commemorative bodies as the U.S. Holocaust 
Memorial Museum and Vad Yashem in Israel” share this view.44  
The United Nations estimates that approximately three million people 
have been displaced and that, in aggregate, over 500,000 individuals killed as 
a direct or indirect result of violence orchestrated by the government in 
 
 40 See infra Section II.C. for discussion of the subsequent case against Jordan. 
 41 The Case against Al-Bashir, BASHIRWATCH, http://bashirwatch.org/updates/#section-case-against-
bashir (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
 42 Eric Reeves, Darfur, the Most Successful Genocide in a Century, HUFFINGTON POST (Apr. 21, 2017, 
10:13AM EST), https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/darfur-the-most-successful-genocide-in-a-century_ 
us_58fa0eb9e4b086ce58980fe3. 
 43 Id.; see also Mia Farrow & Daniel Jonah Goldhagen, Mass Slaughter and Obama’s Mystifying 
Indifference, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 26, 2013), https://www.wsj.com/articles/mass-slaughter-and-obama8217s-
mystifying-indifference-1380236391?tesla=y. 
 44 Reeves, supra note 43. 
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Khartoum,45 making the tragedy “the most successful genocide in a 
century.”46 
Amid mounting international pressure, on March 31, 2005, the U.N.S.C. 
adopted Resolution 193, referring the Darfur conflict to the ICC as a situation 
for investigation.47 Subsequently, having examined the Prosecutor’s 
Application under Article 58, Pre-Trial Chambers issued two arrest warrants 
for President Omar al-Bashir, in 200948 and 2010,49 respectively. The first 
warrant cited seven counts of crimes against humanity and war crimes,50 
while the second added three counts of genocide for the attempted ethnic 
cleansing of the Fur, Masalit, and Zaghawa tribes.51 When issuing the second 
warrant, Pre-Trial Chamber I (PTC I) stated that “there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that Omar Al Bashir acted with specific intent to destroy in 
part the Fur, Masalit and Zaghawa ethnic groups.”52 In addition to the existing 
charges of war crimes and crimes against humanity, the additional charge is 
sufficient to constitute a basis for prosecution under the crime of genocide.53 
Specifically, the Pre-Trial Chamber: (a) recognized the protracted devastation 
in Darfur as a non-international armed conflict (NIAC); (b) acknowledged 
that “a core component of that campaign was the unlawful attack on part of 
the civilian population”; (c) enumerated six categories of offenses allegedly 
committed by Sudanese forces that would constitute genocidal acts, crimes 
against humanity and/or war crimes; and (d) named Omar al-Bashir, as the de 
jure and de facto head of state, head of government, and Commander-in-Chief 
 
 45 Id., citing Eric Reeves, Quantifying Genocide: Darfur Mortality Update, SUDAN RES. ANALYSIS & 
ADVOC. (Jan. 5, 2017), http://sudanreeves.org/2017/01/05/quantifying-genocide-darfur-mortality-update-
august-6-2010/. 
 46 Reeves, supra note 43. 
 47 S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1 (March 31, 2005). 
 48 Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-3, Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a 
Warrant of Arrest against Omar Hussein Ahmad Al Bashir (March 4, 2009), https://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
CourtRecords/CR2009_01517.PDF.  
 49 Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09-94, Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for 
a Warrant of Arrest, https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_04826.PDF. 
 50 Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, supra note 49. 
 51 Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, supra note 50, at ¶ 5. 
 52 Prosecutor v. al-Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Case Information Sheet, https://www.icc-cpi.int/darfur/ 
albashir/Documents/AlBashirEng.pdf (last visited Oct. 22, 2017). 
 53 Article 6 of the Rome Statute defines genocide “as any of the following acts committed with intent 
to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group, as such: (a) Killing members of 
the group; (b) Causing serious bodily or mental harm to members of the group; (c) Deliberately inflicting on 
the group conditions of life calculated to bring about its physical destruction in whole or in part; (d) Imposing 
measures intended to prevent births within the group; (e) Forcibly transferring children of the group to 
another group.” Rome Statute, supra note 32. 
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of the armed forces of Sudan, as playing “an essential role in coordinating the 
design and implementation of the common plan.”54 
Supporters hailed the U.N.S.C.’s landmark referral of the Darfur situation 
to the ICC as ushering in an era governed by “a new politics of justice.”55 
Detractors cited the indictment as an example of the Court’s exercise of 
“twenty-first century neo-colonialism.”56 However, subsequent developments 
(or lack thereof) have supported neither narrative, and instead contributed 
fodder for the overarching impression of impotence, allowing for criticism 
that the possibility of justice for Darfur is illusory57—just so much “sound 
and fury, signifying nothing.”58 
B. Justice Deferred or Justice Denied? 
Across the intervening twelve years, while the toll of dead and displaced 
in Darfur continues to mount,59 the suspect has remained at large.60 As the 
Rome Statute forbids the ICC from prosecuting a defendant in absentia, the 
case has lingered in the purgatory of the pre-trial phase, while the atrocities in 
Sudan continue.61 During that time, President al-Bashir is estimated to have 
made at least eighty-nine international trips to more than a score of countries. 
(See Figure 1).62 Al-Bashir is alleged to have cancelled plans to visit at least 
 
 54 Second Decision on the Prosecution’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, supra note 50, at ¶ 221. 
 55 Caroline Fehl, Growing Up Rough: The Changing Politics of the International Criminal Court, 10 
PEACE RES. INST. FRANKFURT REP. NO. 127 (2014).  
 56 RES SCHUERCH, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AT THE MERCY OF POWERFUL STATES: AN 
ASSESSMENT OF THE NEO-COLONIALISM CLAIM MADE BY AFRICAN STAKEHOLDERS 2-3 (2017). 
 57 See generally Kirsten Ainley, Retreat or Retrenchment? An Analysis of the International Criminal 
Court’s Failure to Prosecute Presidents, in CONTRACTING HUMAN RIGHTS: CRISIS, ACCOUNTABILITY, AND 
OPPORTUNITY (Alison Brysk & Michael Stohl eds. forthcoming 2018); Suzanne Bullock, Prosecuting 
President Al Bashir and the Short Arm of Justice, 25 DENNING L.J. 197 (2013); Stuart Ford, The ICC and the 
Security Council: How Much Support Is There for Ending Impunity, 26 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 33 
(2016); Valiani, supra note 40; Johan D. van der Vyver, The Al Bashir Debacle, 15 AFRICAN HUMAN RIGHTS 
L.J. 559 (2015). 
 58 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 5, sc. 5.  
 59 See Rep. of the Comm. on Human Rights in South Sudan, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/63 (Mar. 6, 2017), 
at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/HRBodies/HRC/CoHSouthSudan/Pages/Index.aspx. 
 60 Case Information Sheet, supra note 53. 
 61 Rome Statute, supra note 32 (providing that “[t]he accused shall be present during the trial.”). For a 
discussion on the controversy around this requirement in light of the request by Kenyan President Uhuru 
Muigai Kenyatta and Deputy President William Samoei Ruto not to be continuously present at their trial, See 
J. D. van der Vyver, Trials in Absentia (manuscript on file with author). Regarding evidence of ongoing 
ethnic cleansing in Sudan, see Rep. of the Comm. on Human Rights in South Sudan, supra note 60. 
 62 Bashir Travels, NUBA REPORTS, https://nubareports.org/bashir-travels/ (last updated April 12, 2017) 
(noting 79 trips to 228 countries along with infographics displaying countries visited and their status as state 
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nine additional countries whose leaders have expressed their intent to 
cooperate with the ICC and execute the warrant.63 Discussing al-Bashir’s 
motivations for the extensive travel, which so clearly flouts the ICC’s arrest 
warrant, one observer emphasized that “[t]his was obviously a political 
decision, meant to show that the president would not be affected by the 
warrant,” before going on to note that “[t]he percentage of official trips that 
al-Bashir was forced to cancel is rising continuously since 2009. While he had 














or non-State Party to the ICC—i.e., signatory or non-signatory to the Rome Statute). Those countries include: 
Algeria, Bahrain, Chad, China, Djibouti, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Egypt, Equatorial 
Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Jordan, Kenya, Kuwait, Libya, Malawi, Mauritania, 
Morocco, Nigeria, Qatar, Rwanda, South Africa, South Sudan, the United Arab Emirates (UAE), and 
Uganda. Since the site was last updated, Bashir has added Russia and Turkey to the list; see also PATRICK S. 
WEGNER, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN ONGOING INTRASTATE CONFLICTS: NAVIGATING THE 
PEACE-JUSTICE DIVIDE 115 (2015) (charting al-Bashir’s travel from his indictment in 2004 to 2012). Since 
the site was last updated, Bashir has additionally traveled to Russia and Turkey. Agence France-Presse, 
Turkish President ‘Laughs Off’ Demand to Arrest Sudan Leader, TIMES ISRAEL (Dec. 28, 2017, 4:05 PM), 
https://www.timesofisrael.com/turkish-president-laughs-off-demand-to-arrest-sudan-leader/.  
 63 These countries include Botswana, the Central African Republic (CAR), France, Malaysia, Turkey, 
Uganda, and Zambia. The Case against Al-Bashir, supra note 39. In 2017, Saudi Arabia joined this list. 
Sudan’s Bashir Declines to Attend Saudi Summit with Trump, BBC (May 19, 2017), http://www.bbc.com/ 
news/world-africa-39978742. 
 64 WEGNER, supra note 63 (charting al-Bashir’s travel from his indictment in 2004 to 2012). 
 65 See NUBA REPORTS, supra note 63. 
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The states visited include nine States Parties to the Rome Statute, which 
fall under the ICC’s jurisdiction and have a responsibility to cooperate with 
the Court.66 All but one of the states is on the African continent.67 As one 
observer recounted: “On each occasion the Prosecutor has taken the proactive 
approach of forewarning the Trial Chamber of Al Bashir’s impending travel 
plans and the latter has issued decisions requesting that the relevant State 
arrest the accused in keeping with the order of the Court. Securing 
cooperation has however proven to be problematic and, thus far, illusory.”68  
This failure to act has been encouraged and abetted by the African Union, 
contributing to what the president of the International Commission of Jurists 
Canada calls “worrying signs that key co-combatants in the fight against 
impunity are retreating from the battlefield.”69 He continues to note that 
culpable actors “include not only recalcitrant regional organizations such as 
the African Union and the Arab League, but even the powerful States Parties 
to the ICC and the U.S. which are on the UN Security Council and doing little 
to come to the aid of the court in getting the arrest warrants issued by the 
Court enforced, especially those against the Sudanese officials.”70 
C. The AU, ICC, and U.N.S.C.: A Bermuda Triangle from which Al-Bashir 
Fails to Emerge  
The AU has taken umbrage with the Court’s approach and repeatedly 
expressed its discontent in various forms.71 As the I.T. Cohen Professor of 
International Law and Human Rights at Emory University School of Law, 
Johan D. van der Vyver, drily observed, the “African Union . . . did not take 
 
 66 For a list of States Parties to the Rome Statute, see The States Parties to the Rome Statute, INT’L 
CRIM. CT., https://asp.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/asp/states%20parties/pages/the%20states%20parties%20to%20 
the%20rome%20statute.aspx (last visited Aug. 8, 2018); Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 12(3); see also 
Understanding the International Criminal Court, supra note 31. For States Parties that have allowed al-
Bashir to visit without executing the warrant for his arrest, see infra Appendix I. 
 67 See NUBA REPORTS, supra note 63. 
 68 Lorraine Smith-van Lin, Non-Compliance and the Law and Politics of State Cooperation: Lessons 
from the Al Bashir and Kenyatta Cases, in COOPERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: 
PERSPECTIVES FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE 114, 121 (Olympia Bekou & Daley J. Birkett, eds. 2016). 
 69 ERROL P. MENDES, PEACE AND JUSTICE AT THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COURT OF 
LAST RESORT 200 (Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010). 
 70 Id. 
 71 See H. Thijssen, The African Union and the International Criminal Court, PEACE PALACE LIB.: LIB. 
BLOG (June 22, 2012), https://www.peacepalacelibrary.nl/2012/06/the-african-union-and-the-international-
criminal-court/. 
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kindly to the indictment of President Al Bashir.”72 First, in July 2009, the AU 
endorsed a proclamation that “the AU Member States shall not cooperate 
pursuant to the provisions of Article 98 of the Rome Statute relating to 
immunities, for the arrest and surrender of Omar El Bashir of The Sudan.”73 
That same year, the AU requested that the UN Security Council suspend the 
ICC proceedings under Article 1674 of the Rome Statute.75 The Security 
Council demurred and declined to defer the case against al-Bashir. 76  
For critics, the selective invocation of the Court’s authority is 
symptomatic of a vendetta by the U.N.S.C. against African nations, as well as 
the Council’s significant vested interest in preserving archaic dynamics that 
afford disproportionate power to the Global North.77 While some degree of 
skepticism predated al-Bashir’s indictment, many African nations were early 
and assiduous supporters of the ICC.78 It was only following the indictment of 
al-Bashir and other Sudanese officials that the “narrative of the court’s anti-
African bias began to take hold among African leaders.”79 The subsequent 
deafening of U.N.S.C. ears regarding deferral redoubled this narrative.80 The 
 
 72 Van der Vyver, Prosecuting the President, supra note 28, at 684. 
 73 Decision of the Meeting of African States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) ¶ 10, U.N. Doc. Assembly/AU/13(XIII) (July 3, 2009). 
 74 Rome Statute, supra note 32. Article 16 allows the U.N.S.C., under its Chapter VII powers, to pass 
a resolution suspending an ICC investigation or prosecution for a period of 12 months, which may be 
renewed. While the U.N.S.C. has not invoked this power to date, its very existence has led critics to 
“conclude that a range of geopolitics has undermined the judicial independence of the ICC . . . [T]he drafting 
history of Article 16 of the Rome Statute shows the workings of the political origins of the law and the 
manner in which foundational inequalities were woven into the very fabric of the Rome Statute.” Kamari 
Maxine Clarke & Sarah-Jane Koulen, The Legal Politics of the Article 16 Decision: The International 
Criminal Court, the UN Security Council, and Ontologies of a Contemporary Compromise, 7 AFR. J. L. 
STUD. 297, 297, 309 (2014); see also Ken Obura, The Security Council and the International Criminal Court: 
When Can the Security Council Defer a Case?, 1 STRATHMORE L.J. 118, 127–28 (2015). 
 75 African Union Peace and Security Council Communiqué, PSC/OR/COMM.(CLXXV) (Mar. 5, 
2009). 
 76 Okoth, supra note 36, at 196, 203. 
 77 SCHUERCH, supra note 57, at 2–3. 
 78 “As a matter of fact, the majority of ICC situations have been self-referred by African States, 
putting the claim of a neo-imperialist court into a different perspective. Moreover, not all African 
governments and members of African civil society attack the ICC equally; most continue their support and 
actively participated in the Review Conference in Kampala.” Ignaz Stegmiller, Positive Complementarity and 
Legitimacy—Is the International Criminal Court Shifting from Judicial Restraint Towards Interventionism, 
in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 247, 266–267 (Nobuo Hayashi & Cecilia M. 
Baillie eds., 2017). 
 79 Victor Peskin, Battles of Legitimation and the Politics of Noncompliance and African Sovereignty 
from the Rwanda Tribunal to the ICC, in THE LEGITIMACY OF INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL TRIBUNALS 401, 
416 (Nobuo Hayashi & Cecilia M. Baillie eds., 2017). 
 80 Id. 
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Security Council’s failure to honor the AU’s request provided the objecting 
states with evidence of the Court as an instrument of neo-colonialism yoked 
to powerful members of the U.N.S.C..81 
In 2010, at the Review Conference of the International Court in Kampala, 
the Malawian delegation, speaking in its capacity as the AU chair, “stated that 
the indictment of heads of state could jeopardize effective co-operation with 
the ICC.”82 The resolution that emanated from the conference expressed the 
AU’s disappointment by the failure of the U.N.S.C. to consider its request for 
a deferral and repeated the request;83 reiterated its ban against AU Member 
State cooperation in al-Bashir’s arrest and surrender;84 requested “Member 
States to balance where applicable, their obligations to the AU with their 
obligations to the ICC”;85 and expressed “concern over the conduct of the ICC 
prosecutor, Mr. Moreno Ocampo, who has been making egregiously 
unacceptable, rude and condescending statements on the case of President 
Omar Hassan El-Bashir of The Sudan and other situations in Africa.”86 
Finally, in 2016 and 2017, several African states announced their intent to 
withdraw from the Rome Statute, citing the Court’s selective justice and 
alleging unfair targeting of the continent.87 On October 27, 2016, one year 
after announcing its intention to withdraw, Burundi became the first country 
in history to officially withdraw from the Rome Statute, disappointing many 
observers who had hoped the State’s leaders would have a change of heart 
amid robust diplomatic inducements to remain.88 While South Africa’s High 
 
 81 See Tim Murithi, The African Court and the International Criminal Court: An Embattled 
Relationship?, INST. JUST. & RECONCILIATION, Mar. 2013, at 6; Makau Mutua, The International Criminal 
Court in Africa: Challenges and Opportunities, BUFFALO L. STUD. RES. PAPER 2011-003 (Sept. 2010), 
http://www.peacebuilding.no/var/ezflow_site/storage/original/application/d5dc6870a40b79bf7c1304f3befe0b
55.pdf.  
 82 Johan D. van der Vyver, Prosecuting President Omar Al Bashir in the International Criminal 
Court, 
http://archivedpublicwebsite.up.ac.za/sitefiles/file/47/15338/PDF%20Files/Johan%20van%20der%20Vyver.
pdf (last accessed Oct. 27, 2017). 
 83 Assembly Dec. 296(XV), A.U. Doc. Doc. Assembly/AU/10(XV), at § 4 (July 27, 2010).  
 84 Id. 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. 
 87 Lyal S. Sunga, Has the ICC Unfairly Targeted Africa or Has Africa Unfairly Targeted the ICC, in 
THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT IN SEARCH OF ITS PURPOSE AND IDENTITY 147 (Triestino Marinello 
ed., 2015). 
 88 Ismail Akwei, Burundi is Officially Not a Member of the International Criminal Court (ICC), 
AFRICA NEWS (Oct. 27, 2017, 12:44 AM), http://www.africanews.com/2017/10/27/burundi-is-officially-not-
a-member-of-the-international-criminal-court-icc/. Subsequently, in response to the initiation of preliminary 
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Court blocked its government’s attempt to withdraw from the Rome Statute, 
the damage to the relationship with the ICC was done.89 
The conflict among these mighty players at loggerheads has escalated in 
gravity and scale to the extent their sparring has emerged as a dominant 
controversy of international criminal justice.90 The adversarial mentality is 
epitomized “by an ideological chasm that has pitted villains against 
protagonists—with both sides casting the other as villains intent on wanton 
destruction and themselves as the protagonists fighting the good fight.”91 It 
remains to be seen whether the standoff can be resolved. However, the March 
2018 election92 of Judge Chile Eboe-Osuji93 as the first African president of 
the ICC may offer a positive signal for future ICC relations on the 
continent.94 In an early official visit, President Eboe-Osuji “assured African 
leaders that the continent would be treated fairly by the Court under his 
leadership[,] . . . blamed the strained relationship between ICC and African 
leaders on [a] ‘communication gap’[,] . . . [and] explained that his first 
 
investigations on their territories, Afghanistan and the Philippines have threatened to withdraw from the 
Rome Statute. On Mar. 17, 2018, the Philippines made good on that threat and, barring rescindment of that 
intention, the withdrawal will come into force one year later. Rome Statute, supra note 32, at art. 127(1); 
Press Release, International Criminal Court, ICC Statement on The Philippines’ Notice of Withdrawal: State 
Participation in Rome Statute System Essential to International Rule of Law, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-
20180320-PR1371 (Mar. 20, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1371. Importantly, the 
investigation and any possible further proceedings may continue notwithstanding the Philippines’ 
withdrawal, as it was under the ICC’s jurisdiction during the period of the alleged activity in question. Rome 
Statute, supra note 32, art. 127(2).  
 89 See, e.g., Burke, supra note 37; Mavhinga, supra note 37. 
 90 Dire Tladi, When Elephants Collide It Is the Grass that Suffers: Cooperation and the Security 
Council in the Context of the AU/ICC Dynamic, 7 AFR. J. LEGAL STUD. 381, 381–82 (2014). 
 91 Id. 
 92 Press Release, New Presidency Elected for 2018-2021, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20180311-
PR1367 (March 11, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1367; see also AT Editor, 
Nigerian named ICC President; Judges from Benin, Uganda Sworn In, AFRICA TIMES (March 12, 2018), 
https://africatimes.com/2018/03/12/nigerian-named-icc-president-new-judges-from-benin-uganda-sworn-in/. 
 93 ICC presidents are elected by their fellow judges sitting in a plenary of fifteen. See Rome Statute, 
supra note 32, art. 38. Judge Eboe-Osuji initially was nominated by the Federal Republic of Nigeria as a 
candidate in the 2011 judicial elections for the ICC. Notably, at that time, he was endorsed by the AU and the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS). Statement of Qualifications, https://asp.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/asp_docs/Elections/EJ2011/ICC-ASP-EJ2011-NI-ST-ENG.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2018). 
 94 As an indication of a renewed efforts to engage African leaders, the Court invited President 
Muhammadu Buhari of Nigeria as guest of honor and keynote speaker at the commemoration of the twentieth 
anniversary of the Rome Statute in July 2018. See Emma Emeozor, Time for an African Court, SUN NEWS 
(July 23, 2018), http://sunnewsonline.com/icc-time-african-court/. However, the gesture was not 
uncontroversial, given that Nigeria currently is an active situation country. See ElombahNews, Buhari’s ICC 
Visit: Detain, Prosecute Him There, Lawyer Writes ICC, ELOMBAH NEWS (July 17, 2018), https://elombah. 
com/buharis-icc-visit-detain-prosecute-buhari-lawyer-writes-icc/. 
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priority in office would be effective communication with all States Parties so 
as to avoid misinformation and misunderstanding.”95   
II. ANALYSIS OF THE PRE-TRIAL CHAMBER’S DECISION 
Beginning with the Republics of Chad and Kenya in 2010, the ICC began 
to consider cases of State Party non-compliance or cooperation with the arrest 
warrant for al-Bashir. To date, the (in)action of eight African states and the 
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan have been considered by the ICC in the matter 
of the Prosecutor v. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir (see Appendix 1 below 
and accompanying citations). The cases are similar in that they each arose 
when al-Bashir traveled to a State Party to the Rome Statute, with the 
knowledge (and indeed, often at the invitation) of state officials.96 They are 
also similar in that, with the telling exception that is the subject of this 
Comment, the Court has (a) held that the offending state failed to meet its 
obligation to cooperate with the arrest warrant; (b) informed the Security 
Council of this failure; and (c) ordered the Registry to immediately transmit 
the decision to the U.N.S.C. and ASP.97 As Appendix I demonstrates, the 
Court’s decision with regard to South Africa is an aberration in an otherwise 
well-established pattern over seven years of jurisprudence.98 Before 
examining the sui generis aspects of the Pre-Trial Chamber II’s decision with 
regard to South Africa, it is necessary to note one procedural distinction: only 
South Africa has “self-referred” the matter for the Court’s consideration, 
while the Court has considered the others at the behest of the U.N.S.C..99 The 
 
 95 News Nigeria, Eboe-Osuji Assures African Leaders of Fairness at the ICC, NEWS NIGERIA (May 
17, 2018), http://thenewsnigeria.com.ng/2018/05/eboe-osuji-assures-african-leaders-of-fairness-at-icc/. 
 96 See infra, Appendix I for relevant case citations. 
 97 Id. But see infra Section II.C. regarding subsequent developments vis-à-vis The Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan. 
 98 Id. 
 99 State referral, including “self-referral,” is one of three mechanisms by which a case can come before 
the ICC. The other two are referral by the U.N.S.C. or, exceptionally, proprio motu, by discretion of the 
Office of the Prosecutor (OTP). Constraints of personal and subject matter jurisdiction apply to all, but the 
latter entails further procedural hurdles designed to safeguard against aggressive approaches to prosecution 
by the OTP. Rome Statute, supra note 32. For a further discussion of trigger mechanisms for the ICC, see, 
for example, Understanding the International Criminal Court, supra note 31. To date, at least eight States 
Parties have “self-referred” cases for the ICC’s adjudication. However, the motives behind these referrals 
have been the subject of controversy. State Party referrals have been made by CAR (twice), Comoros, the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, Gabon, Mali, Uganda, and now, South Africa. How the ICC Works, 
ABA-ICC PROJECT, https://how-the-icc-works.aba-icc.org/ (last visited Oct. 25, 2017); see also Situations 
and Cases, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT, https://www.icc-cpi.int/#, (last visited Oct. 25, 2017). For 
information regarding political controversy surrounding self-referrals; see generally Fehl, supra note 56, at 
4–6; Patrick Wegner, Self-Referrals and the Lack of Transparency at the ICC: The Case of Northern 
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differing “trigger mechanisms” through which the cases came before the ICC 
are a telling detail that would factor significantly into the Court’s decision-
making and which will reemerge later in this Comment.100  
 
A. Crescendo or Broken Record? Tracking the Court’s Decision-Making 
Regarding State Non-Compliance in the Arrest of Omar al-Bashir  
Almost immediately after the issuance of the first warrant for his arrest in 
March 2009, Omar al-Bashir “made a point of traveling.”101 While initially 
confined to neighboring allies, Egypt, Eritrea, Libya, and Saudi Arabia, less 
than a month after the warrant’s promulgation, al-Bashir scored a decisive 
political victory in February 2010, attending the Arab League summit in Qatar 
at which fellow Arab leaders expressed solidarity with and vocally opposed 
al-Bashir’s prosecution.102 To add insult to injury, UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki-Moon was present at the summit as an observer.103 Shortly thereafter, the 
AU issued its resolution roundly rebuking the Office of the Prosecutor, 
leaving proverbial mud on the face of the ICC.104 
Al-Bashir’s first travels to States Parties to the Rome Statute following the 
arrest warrant (and subsequent to the addendum of the crime of genocide in 
February 2010) came in July and August 2010 to Chad and Kenya, to attend 
the Summit of Sahel-Saharan States105 and “celebrations for the promulgation 
of the new Kenyan Constitution,” 106 respectively. The day of al-Bashir’s 
anticipated travel to Kenya (approximately a month after his trip to Chad), a 
 
Uganda, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (Oct. 4, 2011) https://justiceinconflict.org/2011/10/04/self-referrals-and-lack-
of-transparency-at-the-icc-%E2%80%93-the-case-of-northern-uganda/. For information regarding the 
political dimension of Uganda’s self-referral, see generally PHILIPP KASTNER, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE IN BELLO? THE ICC BETWEEN LAW AND POLITICS IN DARFUR AND NORTHERN UGANDA 45–75 
(Martinus Nijhoff, vol. 34 2012).  
 100 See infra, Sections III(B) and III(D)1. 
 101 DAVID BOSCO, ROUGH JUSTICE 156 (2014). 
 102 Id. at 157. 
 103 Id. 
 104 Assembly/AU/Dec.296(XV), supra note 84, at 3. 
 105 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the United Nations 
Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s Recent 
Visit to the Republic of Chad, 3 (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Al-Bashir Chad Non-Compliance Decision I], 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_05769.PDF. 
 106 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the United Nations 
Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s Presence in 
the Territory of the Republic of Kenya, ¶ 2 (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Al-Bashir Kenya Non-Compliance 
Decision], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_05760.PDF. 
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three-judge panel of PTC I issued a matched pair of short, four-page decisions 
finding that both states had an “obligation to cooperate with the Court in 
relation to such warrants of arrest,”107 and informing the Security Council and 
Assembly of States Parties “in order for them to take any measure they may 
deem appropriate.”108 The Registry complied with the Chamber’s order and 
delivered the decisions accordingly to the U.N.S.C. and ASP, where they 
were met with silence.109 
Nonetheless, it took nine months for al-Bashir to again travel to States 
Parties to the Rome Statute, visiting Djibouti and returning to Chad in Spring 
and Summer 2011.110 Several months later—and a day apart from one 
another—the same PTC panel (albeit with a different judge presiding) issued 
two rather different decisions.111 In the case of Chad, PTC I escalated the 
action taken from “informing” to “referring” the present decision to the 
U.N.S.C. and ASP.112 Both the Chad and Malawi decisions also for the first 
time added the states’ failure “to comply with [their] obligations to consult 
with the Chamber by not bringing the issue of Omar Al Bashir’s immunity to 
the Chamber for its determination . . . .”113 The decisions thus reaffirmed the 
states’ duty to consult with the Court under Article 89 of the Rome Statute 
 
 107 Al-Bashir Chad Non-Compliance Decision I, supra note 106. The Kenya decision contains similar, 
but not identical language and states, “[T]he Republic of Kenya has a clear obligation to cooperate with the 
Court in relation to the enforcement of such warrants of arrest.” Al-Bashir Kenya Non-Compliance Decision, 
supra note 107. 
 108 Al-Bashir Chad Non-Compliance Decision I, supra note 106; Al-Bashir Kenya Non-Compliance 
Decision, supra note 107. 
 109 See Report of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/73/349 (Aug. 17, 2017) (“The 
Chamber further observed that despite proposals from various States to develop a follow-up mechanism 
concerning such referrals of States to the Security Council by the Court, past referrals had not resulted in the 
taking of measures by the Council to address instances of failure by States parties to arrest and surrender Mr. 
Al Bashir.”). 
 110 BOSCO, supra note 102, at 158. 
 111 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Informing the United Nations 
Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute about Omar Al-Bashir’s Recent 
Visit to the Republic of Chad, ¶ 6, 7 (Aug. 27, 2010) [hereinafter Al-Bashir Chad Non-Compliance Decision 
II], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2010_05769.PDF; Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-
02/05-01/09, Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Failure by the Republic of 
Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to the Arrest and 
Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir, ¶ 36–47 (Dec. 12, 2011) [hereinafter Al-Bashir Malawi Non-
Compliance Decision], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2011_21722.PDF. 
 112 Al-Bashir Chad Non-Compliance Decision II, supra note 112, at ¶ 6, 7 Al-Bashir Malawi Non-
Compliance Decision, supra note 112, at ¶ 36–47. 
 113 Al-Bashir Malawi Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 112, at ¶ 48. 
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(The Surrender of Persons) and struck a hortative note, imploring action by 
the ASP and/or U.N.S.C..114  
The Malawi decision was also significant (and significantly longer): in 
response to the Malawian brief, the decision rehearsed the corpus of law 
regarding heads of state immunities to refute Malawi’s assertion that the 
principle applied to al-Bashir.115 This was thus the first decision (and the 
lengthiest until the South Africa matter) in which the Court fully articulated 
its rationale for finding a duty to arrest al-Bashir as a sitting head of state.116 
Undeterred, al-Bashir continued his globe-trotting.117 Decisions of a 
similar nature subsequently were taken by various sets of judges sitting for 
PTC II against Chad (again),118 Nigeria,119 and the Democratic Republic of 
the Congo (DRC)120 in 2013 and 2014. The decisions followed a similar 
pattern, with the exception of Nigeria; there, the ex ante holding referred the 
matter to the Federal Republic of Nigeria rather than the U.N.S.C. and 
ASP.121 
By July 2016, when the Court considered the cases of Djibouti and 
Uganda, relations between the AU and the ICC were at an all-time low, with 
momentum churning among African states for a mass exodus from the 
ICC.122 At the same time, even engaged governments, including the European 
 
 114 Rome Statute, supra note 31. 
 115 Al-Bashir Malawi Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 112. 
 116 Id. 
 117 NUBA REPORTS, supra note 63. 
 118 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Non-compliance of the 
Republic of Chad with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court Regarding the Arrest and Surrender of 
Omar Hassan Ahmad Al-Bashir, 3 (Mar. 26, 2013) [hereinafter Al-Bashir Chad Non-Compliance Decision 
III], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_02245.PDF.  
 119 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Cooperation of the Federal 
Republic of Nigeria Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court (Sept. 5, 2013) 
[hereinafter Al-Bashir Nigeria Non-Compliance Decision], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2013_ 
05860.PDF. 
 120 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Cooperation of the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo Regarding Omar Al-Bashir’s Arrest and Surrender to the Court, 3 (Apr. 9, 
2014) [hereinafter Al-Bashir DRC Non-Compliance Decision], https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/ 
CR2014_03452.PDF. 
 121 Al-Bashir Nigeria Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 120. 
 122 See, e.g., Assembly/AU/Dec.366(XVII), Decision on the Implementation of the Assembly 
Decisions on The International Criminal Court Doc. EX.CL/670(XIX) 9, 14 (July 31, 2016) (decrying the 
ICC generally and specifically with regard to the situations in Libya and Sudan), https://au.int/sites/default/ 
files/decisions/9647-assembly_au_dec_363-390_xvii_e.pdf; see also Jean-Baptiste Jeangène Vilmer, The 
African Union and the International Criminal Court: Counteracting the Crisis, 92 INT’L AFFS. 1319 (2016). 
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major powers entreating for al-Bashir’s arrest, struggled to effectively 
respond to his moves, as “[c]oralling Bashir implied routinely sending 
demarches and interceding with governments . . . [n]or were [the major 
powers] willing to link compliance with the ICC arrest warrant to 
development aid or other forms of leverage.”123 For the Obama 
administration, “the effort to quarantine Bashir sometimes succumbed to other 
priorities,” namely, securing a peace agreement in Darfur and shepherding the 
independence of South Sudan.124 Despite the fact that the U.N.S.C. referred 
the situation to the Court in the first place, with key permanent members 
antagonistic (e.g. China, Russia) or ambivalent (the United States), after nine 
separate cases involving seven States Parties, inertia prevailed. Throughout, 
the Prosecutor had little recourse other than “berating key member states for 
their passivity . . . .”125 
The decision in the matter of Djibouti of July 11, 2016 is reflective of the 
Court’s frustration and impatience with the status quo.126 The decision, 
presided over by Judge Cuno Tarfusser (who by this point had been hearing 
nearly identical cases for almost six years), did not mince words when it came 
to Djibouti’s non-compliance, finding “[this controversy] constitutes yet 
another instance in which Djibouti has failed to abide by its obligation to 
cooperate with the Court.”127 However, for the first time, the holding also 
sounded a plaintive note aimed at the U.N.S.C. and ASP: 
[T]he Chamber reiterates once again that, unlike domestic courts, 
the Court has no direct enforcement mechanism and must rely on 
cooperation by the States in order to fulfill its mandate. It is 
therefore of particular importance that the Security Council, after 
referring a situation to the Prosecutor of the Court as constituting a 
threat to international peace and security, responds with any 
appropriate measure to the failure on the part of States Parties to the 
Statute to cooperate with the Court in order for it to fulfil the 
mandate with which it has been entrusted. In the absence of follow-
up actions on the part of the Security Council any referral to the 
 
 123 BOSCO, supra note 102, at 157. 
 124 Id. at 158. 
 125 Id. at 159. 
 126 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision on the Non-Compliance by the 
Republic of Djibouti with the Request to Arrest and Surrender Omar Al-Bashir to the Court and Referring the 
Matter to the United Nations Security Council and the Assembly of State Parties to the Rome Statute, 1, 10 
(July 11, 2016) [hereinafter Al-Bashir Djibouti Non-Compliance Decision], https://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
CourtRecords/CR2016_04946.PDF. 
 127 Id. 
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Court under Chapter VII of Charter of the United Nations would 
become futile and incapable of achieving its ultimate goal of putting 
an end to impunity.128 
With this entreaty unheeded, when the Court rendered its decision in the 
matter of South Africa almost a year later,129 the stage was set for a 
showdown. 
B. The Decision Regarding South Africa 
The parties—the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC and Representatives 
of the Republic of South Africa—did not contest the facts.130 South African 
authorities were aware of al-Bashir’s intent to travel to Pretoria, South Africa 
to participate in the twenty-fifth African Union summit in June 2015.131 In 
anticipation of his visit, state officials requested an advisory opinion from the 
Court on the extent of their duty to arrest al-Bashir while on their sovereign 
territory.132 On June 13, 2015, when he was already on South African soil, 
PTC II issued a decision clarifying South Africa’s obligation to arrest al-
Bashir and surrender him to the Court’s justice.133 Additionally, on June 14, 
2015 the High Court of Pretoria issued an interim order that barred al-Bashir’s 
departure until further notice: “[o]n June 15, the High Court ordered the 
authorities ‘to take all reasonable steps to prepare to arrest President Bashir . . 
. and detain him, pending a formal request for his surrender from the 
International Criminal Court.”134 South African authorities did not deign to 
heed the orders of either the ICC or the High Court; al-Bashir safely departed 
the country on June 15, 2015.135  
This Comment does not assess the merits of the South African defense, 
(and the similar defenses of the other states at issue) or the argument put forth 
by the Office of the Prosecutor. What is important to note in this context, 
summarizing, condensing, and reducing a complex dispute, is that South 
Africa cited to Article 98(1) of the Rome Statute—a provision included at the 
behest of several cagey states that affirms that  
 
 128 Id. 
 129 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
 130 Id. 
 131 Id. 
 132 Id. 
 133 Id. 
 134 Id. 
 135 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
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[t]he Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or 
assistance which would require the requested State to act 
inconsistently with its obligations under international law with 
respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a person or property 
of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the co-operation of 
that third State for waiver of the immunity.136  
The Office of the Prosecutor contended that such an expansive reading of 
Article 98 “has not [been] supported by many analysts or by the ICC itself. 
They [have] insisted that States Parties are without further ado legally obliged 
to arrest and to surrendering President Al Bashir for trial . . . basing their 
position on Article 27 of the ICC Statute.”137 Article 27 states, in part, that: 
[The Rome] Statute shall apply equally to all persons without any 
distinction based on official capacity. In particular, official capacity 
as a Head of State of Government . . . shall in no case exempt a 
person from criminal responsibility under this Statute . . . . 
Immunities or special procedural rules which may attach to the 
official capacity of a person . . . shall not bar the Court from 
exercising its jurisdiction over such person.138 
PTC II’s decision is bifurcated into Parts A and B.139 Part A answered the 
question: “Whether South Africa failed to comply with the request for arrest 
and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir contrary to the provisions of the Statute.”140 
Put bluntly, the answer was “yes,” with the Pre-Trial Chamber affirming the 
Prosecutor’s argument and rejecting South Africa’s defense on the grounds of 
sovereign immunity.141 However, this issue was only the first of two before 
the Chamber.142  
While Part A contained the Chamber’s legal reasoning, it is Part B that is 
most pertinent in considering how the Court navigates its relationships with 
states and international organizations. Part B considered “[w]hether a referral 
of the matter to the Assembly of States Parties or the Security Council is 
warranted.”143 Part B sends two powerful messages: Part B.1. is addressed to 
 
 136 Rome Statute, supra note 32. 
 137 Van der Vyver, Prosecuting the President, supra note 28. 
 138 Rome Statute, supra note 32. 
 139 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
 140 Id. 
 141 Id. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
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South Africa, as emollient and pacification.144 Part B.2. is addressed to the 
U.N.S.C. and ASP as chastisement and spur (with a dash of self-
absolution).145 
With regard to Part B.1., the title of a representative press release by the 
Southern Africa Litigation Centre—“ICC Finding on South Africa’s Non-
Compliance Falls Short”—captured the initial reaction to the decision by the 
non-governmental organization (NGO) community.146 The statement 
maintained, “we are disappointed in the ICC’s decision not to impose a 
sufficiently harsh penalty against South Africa for its non-compliance.”147 
This impulsive analysis, while understandable, also was myopic; it failed to 
view this single skirmish in terms of the greater existential war the ICC faces.  
On February 22, 2017, the High Court of South Africa blocked as 
unconstitutional its government’s attempts to withdraw from the ICC.148 
While praised by proponents of the ICC, President Jacob Zuma’s 
administration unsurprisingly denounced the High Court’s decision as 
furthering the pursuit of the “imperialist agendas of foreign nations.”149 The 
High Court’s repudiation served as fodder for critics of the scandal-plagued 
Zuma administration, who saw the attempted maneuver as a preemptive 
safeguard against future prosecutions against Zuma and his allies.150 
In this political minefield, another opprobrium against a truant State Party 
would only fan the flames of discontent by South Africa and its allies. And 
yet, the Court’s prior jurisprudence had made its position quite clear; retreat at 
this juncture would severely impact the ICC’s legitimacy.151 The nuanced 
verbiage of PTC II’s decision cannily managed to commend South Africa, 
 
 144 Id. 
 145 Id. 
 146 SALC Staff Writer, News Release: ICC Finding on South Africa’s Non-Compliance Falls Short, 
SOUTHERN AFRICA LITIGATION CENTRE (July 7, 2017), http://www.southernafricalitigationcentre.org/2017/ 
07/07/news-release-icc-finding-on-south-africas-non-compliance-falls-short/. 
 147 Id. 
 148 James Macharia, South African Court Block’s Government’s ICC Withdrawal Bid, REUTERS 
(Feb. 22, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-safrica-icc/south-african-court-blocks-governments-icc-
withdrawal-bid-idUSKBN1610RS.  
 149 Kevin Sieff & Krista Mahr, South Africa Says it Will Quit the International Court, WASH. POST 
(Oct. 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/africa/south-africa-says-it-will-quit-the-international-
criminal-court/2016/10/21/0eb8aa66-978f-11e6-9cae-2a3574e296a6_story.html?utm_term=.a4da1b2db710. 
 150 See, e.g., Henning Melber, Is South Africa’s Departure from the International Criminal Court a 
Sinister Sign of Things to Come?, BIZ NEWS (Oct. 31, 2016), https://www.biznews.com/thought-leaders/ 
2016/10/31/south-africa-international-criminal-court. 
 151 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
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even while finding (once again) that it failed to meet its obligations as a State 
Party. 
The PTC found that South Africa “distinguish[ed its] conduct from that of 
other states that, in the past have been involved in proceedings under article 
87(7) of the Statute.”152 In voluminous detail, the Chamber praised South 
Africa’s invocation of its Article 97 obligations.153 PTC II also resoundingly 
rejected the Prosecutor’s arguments (a) that the delay in bringing the matter 
before the Court was evidence of bad faith in cooperation, and (b) that South 
Africa “took measures to create a legal impediment of the pending Arrest 
Warrants.”154 In both instances, the Chamber accepted as reasonable South 
Africa’s explanation that “any delay . . . arose as a result of domestic 
processes” and further cited the “certain level of uncertainty due to the 
novelty of the issues involving the use of the instrument of consultations with 
the Court.”155 
Thus, at a time when the stakes were highest, in one masterful stroke, the 
Court stood its ground on principle while extending an olive branch (and 
opportunity to save face) to a volatile State Party.156 In contrast, the Chamber 
conveyed far less conciliatory messages to the U.N.S.C. and ASP.157 Part IV 
of this Comment will attempt to interpret these communiqués. Beforehand, 
however, a brief interlude is necessary to account for the latest chapter in the 
al-Bashir saga. 
C. Coda: The Case of Jordan  
On December 11, 2017, during this Comment’s drafting, Pre-Trial 
Chamber II heard yet another case of State Party non-compliance in al-
Bashir’s arrest—the first subsequent to the case of South Africa.158 Aware of 
al-Bashir’s intent to accept an invitation to the Arab League Summit in 
Amman, authorities of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan transmitted two 
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 158 Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Decision Under Article 87(7) of the Rome 
Statute on the Non-Compliance by Jordan with the Request by the Court for the Arrest and Surrender of 
Omar Al-Bashir (Dec. 11, 2017) [hereinafter Al-Bashir Jordan Non-Compliance Decision], https://www.icc-
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notes verbale to the ICC Registry, affirming the Jordanian understanding of 
its international obligations (contrary to the Court’s preceding decisions, 
Jordanian interlocutors adhered to the belief that “its international obligations, 
including [the] applicable rules of customary international law” prohibited the 
arrest of al-Bashir on the grounds of sovereign immunity).159 Consequently, 
Omar al-Bashir “travelled to Jordan and attended the 28th Arab League 
Summit in Amman on 29 March 2017. While he was on Jordanian territory, 
Jordan did not arrest and surrender him to the Court.”160  
Al-Bashir’s continued flouting of his outstanding arrest warrant to attend 
a major international summit and the acquiescence by a host State Party 
would appear to adhere to the established pattern; however, the Jordanian 
episode has proven sui generis in two key respects. Most obviously, for the 
first time, the State Party failing to comply with al-Bashir’s arrest warrant was 
not on the African continent.161 Jordan’s geographic position beyond the Suez 
could not further bolster a narrative that the Court selectively and unfairly 
targets African nations. Second, Jordan is the only country to have pursued its 
defense vis-à-vis al-Bashir seriously and juridically in the forum of the 
ICC.162 
With two options as to how to proceed with regard to Jordan’s initial non-
compliance, to refer or not to refer was the question. An identical bench 
composed of the same judges163 departed from their decision in the South 
Africa case and referred the report of Jordan’s non-cooperation to the ASP 
and U.N.S.C..164 In fact, Jordan became the first State Party granted leave to 
appeal a decision regarding its obligation to arrest and surrender al-Bashir.165  
 
 159 Id. at 5. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. 
 162 See infra, note 165. 
 163 Presiding Judge Cuno Tarfusser, Judge Chang-ho Chung, and Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut 
constituted the Chamber. But See Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09, Minority Opinion of 
Judge Marc Perrin de Brichambaut, ICC-02/05-01/09-309-Anx-tENG (Dec. 14, 2017), ICC-02/05-01/09-
309-Anx-tENG (finding an alternative basis for state responsibility in Jordan’s and Sudan’s accession to the 
Genocide Convention). 
 164 Id.  
 165 Shortly after granting leave to appeal, the Appeals Chamber “invited observations” from the 
United Nations and Regional Organizations (specifically the African Union, the European Union, the League 
of Arab States and the Organization of American States), as well as “ICC States Parties and Professors of 
International Law on legal questions raised by Jordan.” Press Release, Al Bashir Case: ICC Appeals 
Chamber Invites Observations from International Organizations, States Parties and Professors of 
International Law on Legal Matters Raised by Jordan, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20180329-PR1375 
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The Jordanian case is ongoing and will doubtless provide much fodder for 
future inquiry. While the outcome is unknown, what has been confirmed 
through the adjudication to date is that “non-referral” is not the ICC’s new 
default policy stance. It therefore is all the more important to unpack what the 
Court was attempting to accomplish in its exceptional South Africa decision 
and why.  
III. THE DEVIL IS IN THE DICTA: DECODING THE MESSAGES TO THE U.N.S.C. 
AND ASP IN THE SOUTH AFRICA DECISION 
Paradoxically, although it “was highly anticipated and the finding of non-
compliance on the part of South Africa widely expected,”166 PTC II’s decision 
nonetheless “came as quite the surprise.”167 The surprise was not the non-
compliance finding, although some observers have argued that the rationale 
given helped clarify previously muddy waters regarding the legal basis for the 
Court’s repeated findings of state obligation in light of the conflicting Article 
98 vs. Article 27 arguments.168  
In addition to the question of non-compliance, the Chamber weighed the 
following question: “[w]hether a referral of the matter to the Assembly of 
States Parties and/or the Security Council is warranted.”169 It was this answer 
 
(Mar. 28, 2021), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1375. Subsequently, on May 25, 2015, the 
Appeals Chamber “invited submissions, by 16 July 2018, from the competent authorities of the Republic of 
Sudan and Mr. Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir on the legal questions raised by the Hashemite Kingdom of 
Jordan.” Press Release, Al Bashir Case: ICC Appeals Chamber Invites Submissions from Sudan and Mr Al 
Bashir on Legal Questions Raised by Jordan, ICC Press Release ICC-CPI-20180525-PR1385 (May 25, 
2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=pr1385. In total, the Court received eleven amici 
curiae submissions. See Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-10/09, Prosecution Response to the 
Eleven Amici Curiae, (July 16, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2018_03719.PDF. In another 
novel development, from September 10 to 14, the Appeals Chamber for the first time heard oral testimony in 
the case, including from representatives of Jordan and the African Union, academic amici, and the Office of 
the Prosecutor. Media Advisory, Al-Bashir Case: ICC Appeals Chamber Hearing Submissions on Legal 
Matters Raised by Jordan from 10 to 14 September 2018, ICC Media Advisory ICC-CPI-20180904-MA232 
(Sept. 4, 2018), https://www.icc-cpi.int/Pages/item.aspx?name=ma232. 
 166 Beitel van der Merwe, Non-Compliance with a Twist: Some Thoughts on the ICC’s Decision on 
South Africa’s Failure to Arrest and Surrender President Al-Bashir, ICJ AFRICA (July 14, 2017), 
https://www.icjafrica.com/single-post/2017/07/14/Non-compliance-with-a-twist-Some-thoughts-on-the-
ICCs-decision-on-South-Africas-failure-to-arrest-and-surrender-President-Al-Bashir. 
 167 Mark Kersten, Good Politics or Bad Law? The International Criminal Court, Bashir, and South 
Africa, JUSTICE IN CONFLICT (July 21, 2017), https://justiceinconflict.org/2017/07/21/good-politics-or-bad-
law-the-international-criminal-court-bashir-and-south-africa/. 
 168 Jacobs, supra note 30. But see Prosecutor v. Al-Bashir, Case No. ICC-02/05-01/09-302, Minority 
Opinion of Judge Brichambaut (July 6, 2017), https://www.icc-cpi.int/RelatedRecords/CR2017_04403.pdf. 
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that occasioned the astonishment of longstanding ICC observers.170 The 
Chamber found that referral was not warranted based on consideration of (a) 
“South Africa’s interactions with the Court with respect to the execution of 
the Court’s request and surrender of Omar Al-Bashir” and (b) “[w]hether a 
referral of South Africa’s non-compliance would be an effective way to foster 
cooperation.”171  
This portion of the decision may read as dicta. However, dismissing this 
section on those grounds would be to underestimate the rarity, strategic 
maneuvering, and potential weight of the Court’s opinion. 
A. Debunking the Fallacy of the ICC as Sheriff 
Considerable anxiety regarding the ICC emanates from the specter of 
selective targeting and prosecutorial freewheeling.172 This phantom menace 
has been cunningly analogized to the proverbial Old West sheriff whose 
responsibility, while legally authorized, is highly discretionary and whose 
mandate “conflates in one person the three different functions of law in a 
political order: legislation, judgment, and enforcement.”173 While the sheriff’s 
actions may be legitimate based on a credible mandate and even a moral 
justification, his unilateral behavior stands to “increase his own power at the 
expense of other agents in the community.”174 Thus, much of the ink spent on 
hand-wringing over the ICC has focused on the role of the Office of the 
Prosecutor (OTP), who would seem to personify the sheriff-in-chief.175 While 
pervasive and (apparently) persuasive apocrypha, the depiction of the ICC as 
marshal176 misses the mark based on both statute and precedent.177  
 
 170 Kersten, supra note 168. 
 171 Al-Bashir South Africa Non-Compliance Decision, supra note 1. 
 172 See Aidan Hehir & Anthony F. Lang, Jr., The Impact of the Security Council on the Efficacy of the 
International Criminal Court and the Responsibility to Protect, in HUMANITARIANISM AND CHALLENGES OF 
COOPERATION 199 (Volker M. Heins, et al. eds., 2016). 
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 176 Hehir & Lang make the important distinction between the sheriff, who is officially authorized by 
the state, and the vigilante, who “may be acting in conformity with a shared normative sensibility about who 
deserves punishment, but [who does not have] an officially sanctioned role.” Hehir & Lang, Jr., supra note 
174, at 199. 
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At the most basic level, the ICC is not a monolithic entity conflating 
legislative, judicial, and executive functions.178 First, based on the Rome 
Statute, the Court has no legislative capacity.179 Second, conceptualizing the 
ICC as an “executive” organ at all requires unpacking. The ability of the 
Prosecutor to initiate investigations proprio motu was among the most 
controversial and hotly contested items on the Rome agenda.180 While it 
remains divisive and has been the apparent cause for several states to refrain 
from accession,181 the final statute contains numerous checks and safeguards 
designed to mitigate the OTP’s powers, which are enshrined, inter alia, in 
Articles 13(c), 15, and 53(1).182 In addition to falling within the subject matter 
jurisdiction of the Court183 and ascribing to the principle of complementarity 
(whereby states must demonstrate the inability or unwillingness to genuinely 
prosecute a crime within the Court’s jurisdiction),184 Article 15 raises the bar 
regarding the admissibility of proprio motu investigations.185 Given the 
heightened requirements, it is perhaps unsurprising that the OTP has only 
invoked this power twice (in the matter of Kenya’s post-election violence and 
the situation in Cote d’Ivoire) and that both instances have been highly 
controversial.186 Moreover, as previously mentioned, the ICC has no 
enforcement mechanism.187 
 
 177 Rome Statute, supra note 32; see also Understanding the International Criminal Court, supra note 
31. 
 178 See, e.g., Understanding the International Criminal Court, supra note 31. 
 179 Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 15(1) (“The Prosecutor may initiate investigations proprio motu 
on the basis of information on crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court.”). 
 180 See, e.g., Kafayat Quadri, The Proprio Motu Power of the ICC Prosecutor: Why Some States Have 
Refused to Ratify the Rome Statute, 2 INT’L J. OF HUMAN. & MGMT. SCI. 11, 11 (2014); Manuel Ventura, 
Proprio Motu Investigations by the ICC Prosecutor, THE PEACE AND JUSTICE INITIATIVE: TOWARD 
UNIVERSAL IMPLEMENTATION OF THE ICC STATUTE, http://www.peaceandjusticeinitiative.org/ 
implementation-resources/proprio-motu-investigation-by-the-icc-prosecutor (last accessed Jan. 5, 2018). 
 181 Id. 
 182 Rome Statute, supra note 32, arts. 13(c), 15, and 53(1). 
 183 Id. 
 184 Id. 
 185 Article 15 mandates additional procedural mechanisms (prior investigation and review by a Pre-
Trial Chamber, a higher evidentiary standard (reasonable basis for belief of wrongdoing) and reiterates the 
gravity requirement. It is not the Prosecutor, but the PTC that then decides whether the investigation may 
proceed. Rome Statute, supra note 32, art. 15. 
 186 Quadri, supra note 182. 
 187 See, e.g., Nada Ali, Bringing the Guilty to Justice: Can the ICC be Self-Enforcing?, 14 CHICAGO J. 
OF INT’L L. 408 (2014). 
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It is therefore quite incorrect to accord the ICC the appellation of 
“sheriff.”188 Conversely, although there is nothing in the U.N. Charter that 
designates the U.N.S.C. as an executive body, that designation and 
association has emerged over time.189 Observers have noted: “The UN 
Security Council’s functions often resemble those of an executive, and it 
comes closest to the power to take authoritative decisions for the maintenance 
of international peace and security . . . .”190 As such, it has been suggested that 
the “source of the seemingly antagonistic posture of the African Union 
against the ICC [can] be traced, not to the ICC itself, but to the United 
Nations Security Council.”191 
B. The Struggle for Symbiosis 
Frustratingly, “the major weaknesses of the Court do not seem to derive 
from the deficiencies of its legal apparatus . . . . They do not lie either in lack 
of, or poor, implementation of the ICC at the national level.”192 Instead, the 
ICC’s greatest vulnerability is its dependency.193 Former Prosecutor for the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia Louse Arbour 
understatedly opined: “In contemporary practice, the [Security] Council has 
‘not convincingly demonstrate[d] an exemplary commitment to the Court and 
its pursuit of international accountability.’”194  
Describing the relationship between the UN Security Council and the 
ICC’s antecedents, the ad hoc tribunals, two observers offered the memorable 
understatement: “The supremacy of politics over law has always been 
awkward. . . .”195 Unlike the ad hoc tribunals, which were created by 
U.N.S.C. resolutions and thus depended on the U.N.S.C. for their legitimacy, 
the ICC stands on its own feet, having been created by treaty, which conferred 
 
 188 See Understanding the International Criminal Court, supra note 31 (“In establishing the ICC, the 
States set up a system based on two pillars. The Court itself is the judicial pillar. The operational pillar 
belongs to States, including the enforcement of Court’s orders.”). 
 189 See generally MICHAEL MATHESON, COUNCIL UNBOUND (2006). 
 190 Burke & Weiss, supra note 12, at 241. 
 191 Ovo Catherine Imoedehe, Unpacking the Tension Between the African Union and the ICC: The Way 
Forward, in THE COMPLEMENTARITY REGIME OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 123 (2017). 
 192 Annalisa Cimapi, Legal Rules, Policy Choices and Political Realities in the Functioning of the 
Cooperation Regime of the International Criminal Court, in COOPERATION AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
CRIMINAL COURT: PERSPECTIVES FROM THEORY AND PRACTICE 7, 46 (Olympia Bekou & Daley J. Birkett, 
eds. 2016). 
 193 Id. 
 194 Ruiz Verduzco, supra note 26, at 33. 
 195 Burke & Weiss, supra note 12, at 242.  
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on the Court an independent foundation in the international legal order.196 
And yet, the “awkwardness” persists, as the U.N.S.C. and ICC now share 
responsibility for global peace and security.197  
Former Special Assistant to the President of the Assembly of States 
Parties Deborah Ruiz Verduzco posited three general lenses for the interplay 
between the ICC and U.N.S.C.: a “functionalist” logic, portraying the ICC as 
a “tool” of the Council; a contrasting vision, stressing judicial independence 
and the need for institutional autonomy; and one purporting the Council as the 
executive enforcement organ for the ICC, thereby supporting the functionality 
of the Rome Statute. All three dimensions have become evidence in different 
areas of practice.”198 
The former paradigm would clearly be most attractive to a Security 
Council intent on retaining its power. However, “[t]he idea of the ICC as an 
‘enforcement tool of the Council’ stands in conflict with concerns of judicial 
independence and with the necessary separation between the ‘judicial’ and the 
‘political’ space.”199 Such a posture “may entail dangerous consequences 
when taken to the extreme. The leverage of international justice is weakened 
when used as a tool by the Council to promote specific political agendas.”200 
At the same time, complete judicial autonomy is impracticable when the 
Court lacks its own enforcement mechanism.201  
Given the inadequacies of the two previous models, Ruiz Verduzco 
exhumed a surprisingly early defense of the third archetype, tracing its 
genealogy to Alexander I of Russia, who first advocated in 1818 for a  
supranational mechanism to prosecute individuals engaged in the 
slave trade. The proposal recognized expressly that additional 
execute authority was necessary to enforce the decisions of such 
mechanism. . . . A supreme council was charged with the mandate 
to coordinate the operations of the naval force, execute the orders of 
the tribunal, and report back to the organization’s member states.202 
 
 196 Hehir & Lang, supra note 173, at 202. 
 197 Id. 
 198 Ruiz Verduzco, supra note 26, at 31. 
 199 Id. at 33. 
 200 Id. at 32. 
 201 See, e.g., Ali, supra note 189. 
 202 Ruiz Verduzco, supra note 26, at 34.  
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When exploring avenues for the ICC to claim its space between the 
proverbial “rock and hard place,” scholars have entertained a panoply of 
functional and procedural alternatives. Some emphasize the importance of 
prosecutorial discretion.203 Others scrutinize and recommend reforms to the 
systems of referral and deferral,204 and consider ways to instrumentalize the 
principle of complementarity more effectively.205 One enterprising academic 
has attempted to employ game theory to explain the deterrent effect of ICC 
arrest warrants on future criminal conduct by state leaders.206 Some creative 
commentators have gone further, exploring ways in which the Court might 
leverage the International Monetary Fund and World Bank207 and the court of 
public opinion through publication of preliminary examinations and 
monitoring activities.208 Others have persistently (and controversially) 
advocated for guilty pleas and plea bargaining practices, suggesting that a 
“more supportive institutional practice” 209 could appease troublesome states 
(plea bargaining was a common feature of the ad hoc tribunals; Ahmad Al 
Mahdi’s guilty plea in March 2016 was the first heard by the ICC).210 All of 
these ideas have merit and should be explored as possible mechanisms to 
strengthen the Court and the international justice system. 
C. Forging Ahead 
As Ruiz Verduzco has noted, “[t]he Rome Statute provides no guidance 
regarding how the Council or the Assembly should respond before, during, or 
after an instance of non-cooperation.”211 A Resolution adopted on December 
21, 2011 aimed to address this lacuna by introducing a mechanism mandating 
the involvement of the President of the Assembly, the Bureau, and the plenary 
 
 203 See, e.g., KASTNER, supra note 100 (envisioning “a possibly proactive role of the ICC Prosecutor 
through his prosecutorial discretion”). 
 204 See, e.g., DUTTON, supra note 24; CHRISTOPHER K. LAMONT, INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
AND THE POLITICS OF COMPLIANCE (2010). 
 205 See, e.g., Diane Marie Amann, The International Criminal Court and the Sovereign State, in 
GOVERNANCE AND INTERNATIONAL LEGAL THEORY 185 (W.G. Werner & I.F. Dekker eds., 2004); Sibylle 
Scheipers, NEGOTIATING SOVEREIGNTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY AND THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT (2009). 
 206 Ali, supra note 188. 
 207 MENDES, supra note 70, at 190–97. 
 208 Id. at 133. 
 209 Alex Whiting, Developing a Practice Around Guilty Pleas at the ICC, JUST SECURITY (Apr. 4, 
2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/30399/developing-practice-guilty-pleas-icc/. 
 210 Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, (Sept. 17, 2016), 
https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.PDF. 
 211 Ruiz Verduzco, supra note 26, at 49. 
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to acknowledge, discuss, and resolve on a course of action in instances of 
failure to cooperate.212 In practice, the President of the Assembly has reacted 
to the Court’s reports of non-cooperation by meeting with the President of the 
Security Council “to clarify how the Council might properly react to 
communications by the Court.”213 However, as Ruiz Verduzco points out, 
“[r]egrettably, there is no public record” of these conversations.214  
An open and public dialogue among representatives of the Court, the 
Assembly, and the Security Council may not yield al-Bashir’s arrest, but 
could demonstrate that the ICC’s decisions had at least been heard and taken 
into consideration. Alternatively, of the “various ways in which interaction 
between the Council and the Court may be improved after a referral . . . . [i]t 
has, in particular, been suggested that the Council Working Group on 
Tribunals could serve as a forum for dialogue on follow-up.”215 
Moreover, these talking shops need not necessarily be exercises of empty 
chatter. There are proposed—albeit uncharted—courses of action: “[p]ossible 
reactions include (i) the issuing of a Press Statement or a Presidential 
Statement, or (ii) the adoption of a resolution calling for cooperation, 
condemning failure to arrest, or calling states to arrest ICC fugitives.”216 
Freezing and/or seizure of assets have been suggested as other “sticks” at the 
Security Council’s disposal.217 The threat of sanctions always lurks in the 
background.218  
At this point, what may be most important is that some action—any 
action—is taken by the ICC’s empowering organs with regard to its findings 
of non-cooperation in the arrest of al-Bashir. Closing with a final bracing 
quote from Ruiz Verduzco:  
The relationship between the Court and the Council is marked by 
tensions between law, politics, and judicial diplomacy. The 
promotion of accountability requires fresh initiatives to address the 
challenges in the interaction between the two bodies. . . . An 
improvement of the status quo requires a better balancing of 
 
 212 Annex to the ASP Resolution, Strengthening the International Criminal Court and the Assembly of 
States Parties, ICC-ASP/10/Res.5 (Dec. 21, 2011). 
 213 Ruiz Verduzco, supra note 26, at 49. 
 214 Id. 
 215 Id. at 61. 
 216 Id. at 49. 
 217 Id. at 61. 
 218 Id.  
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interests. Interaction needs to take into account judicial 
independence and the virtues and necessity of the Council as agent 
for the Court. . . . Mechanisms of follow-up must be coherent . . . . 
The declarations of the Council should reflect [its] commitment and 
leave no doubt as to the support enjoyed by the Court 
internationally.219  
CONCLUSION: DISCRETION AS ASSERTION 
On a 2006 visit to Tokyo on the eve of Japan’s (relatively late) deposit of 
its instrument of ratification to the Rome Statute, former ICC President 
Philippe Kirsch confidently asserted that “[t]here’s not a shred of evidence 
after three-and-a-half years that the court has done anything political. The 
court is operating purely judicially.”220 It should be obvious that President 
Kirsch meant that the Court’s motivations are not borne of nefarious 
motivations and that its activities should not be politicized. However, if it is to 
uphold its role in the fight against impunity, the Court cannot, and should not, 
be agnostic in its relationships with other bodies. 
One commentator has attempted to reconcile the ICC’s profoundly 
idealistic origins and more terrestrial operations, explaining that, 
“acknowledging this underlying political objective of the ICC makes more 
intelligible and defensible certain political limits on its mandate and 
jurisdiction.”221 Not only is it impractical to imagine an entirely apolitical 
ICC, it may also be undesirable; put another way “to say that the Court should 
never become politicized is to ignore its role in enforcing peace and security. 
On the other hand, it is important that we prevent geopolitical interests from 
intruding on the operations of the ICC.”222 
 
 219 Ruiz Verduzco, supra note 26, at 50. More critically, Ruiz Verduzco also admonishes “the failure of 
the Council to use these techniques sends an ambivalent message. It suggests that the Council uses the ICC 
whenever it is convenient for Council members, while turning a blind eye on the Court when its mandate 
needs to be operationalized. This contradiction raises doubts as to what extent the Council usefully serves as 
an executive arm for the Court.” Id. at 61. 
 220 Steve Herman, Japan’s Expected to Join International Criminal Court, VOICE AMERICA (June 12, 
2006), http://www.amazines.com/article_detail.cfm/183987?articleid=183987. 
 221 Catherine Lu, The International Criminal Court as an Institution of Moral Regeneration: Problems 
and Prospects, in BRINGING POWER TO JUSTICE? THE PROSPECTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 
191, 194 (Joanna Harrington et al. eds., 2006). 
 222 STEVEN C. ROACH, POLITICIZING THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE CONVERGENCE OF 
POLITICS, ETHICS, AND LAW 6 (2006). 
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In the South Africa decision, the Court seemingly confined itself to a 
ruling on the legal merits of the case and refrained from further political 
engagement or enforcement vis-à-vis a State Party (i.e. referring South Africa 
to the U.N.S.C. and ASP for censure or sanction). However, by choosing not 
to refer the case to the ASP or U.N.S.C., the Court broke with tradition and 
sent a powerful message.223 
As ICC President Eboe-Osuji reminded onlookers on the twentieth 
anniversary of the Rome Statute on July 17, 2018,  
Like every other human institution . . . there will always be an 
ongoing need to reform the Court and its processes, in order to 
improve its ability to achieve its mandate with greater purpose and 
efficiency [while] leaving undiluted the essential properties that 
make this Court a vital instrument of accountability.224  
Given the connotations attached to “political” maneuvers, it may be more 
diplomatic to interpret the bench as acting “tactically” in its decision 
regarding South Africa. Regardless of semantics, however, the decision 
should be read as a gambit by a still-nascent judicial institution on a playing 
field embedded with inherent formalistic and mounting practical challenges. 
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